Greece-Macedonia Name Talks to Resume

Greek and Macedonian negotiators in the name row are to meet Thursday in New York with the UN, Macedonian diplomats have told Balkan Insight.

The diplomats who wish to stay anonymous said the meeting with the Greek ambassador to the United Nations, Adamantios Vassilakis and his Macedonian counterpart Nikola Dimitrov would be in preparation for UN envoy Matthew Nimetz’s planned visit to the region soon.

Macedonia’s government spokesman Ivica Bocevski on Monday neither confirmed nor denied the information for Balkan Insight.

The meeting will take place after they were stalled due to the June 1 general elections in Macedonia.

Greek-Macedonia relations hit a new low in April after Athens vetoed Skopje’s invitation to join NATO arguing that the country should change its name first.

Greece says the name Macedonia implies Skopje's territorial claims over Greece's own northern province of the same name. The name row has been ongoing for 17 years. UN-sponsored talks have failed to provide a breakthrough in the dispute so far.

Skopje should solve the row by July 9 if it wishes to catch up with Albania and Croatia who in April secured their NATO invitations. On that date both countries are to sign the accession protocol with the alliance.

But analysts in both countries argue it would be highly unlikely for a quick compromise solution to be reached soon considering the hardline rhetoric of both Skopje and Athens expressed in the last months.

On Friday Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis said in Athens that his country’s position towards Macedonia’s name “remains unchanged.”

Previously Macedonia’s Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki expressed pessimism about a quick solution, blaming Athens for not recognising Macedonia’s ethnic identity.

Skopje’s gateway to the EU and NATO is closing

The elections in Skopje that were attended with violence and violations turned FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) into European and American problem, Greek Ethnos online edition announced. According to the author of the article Macedonia suffered a defeat in disaster dimensions over its prestige in abroad as well as its internal political background. Europeans and Americans plainly have doubts weather Skopje is ready to become EU and NATO member state, the edition pointed out.
New York Times newspaper defined Macedonia as the “new problem child of the Balkans”. According to Ethnos’s article the situation about the name issue dispute with Athens is getting different and Greek foreign policy must use its new opportunities after the elections. There is no more chance for Skopje to join Croatia and Albania and to sigh the agreement for NATO membership on July 9, the edition said.

Nicolas Sarkozy: Naming dispute Athens-Skopje should be solved before any kind of membership

The Greeks can rely on France, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy said speaking from the tribune of the Greek Parliament, the Greek agency ANA-MPA reports.
Sarkozy, who is visiting Athens, said that he wanted to offer Greece a new slogan – ‘Greece-France – a new union’ and confirmed Paris’ support for the Greek positions. Sarkozy outlined that the naming dispute between Athens and Skopje must be solved before any kind of accession of FYROM to the Euro-Atlantic organization.

How to Solve the Greek Dispute over Macedonia's Name

Following a winter of discord over the question of Kosovo’s independence, NATO heads of state convened in Bucharest in April, largely unified on the Balkans. The alliance was poised to invite three countries from the region to be new members: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. Like its neighbors, Macedonia had fulfilled NATO’s reform criteria. It had also met various political demands by Western powers concerning the country’s peace agreement between the majority ethnic Macedonians and minority Albanians. In addition, since 2003 Macedonia had continuously deployed troops to the US-led engagement in Iraq as well as to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

As the summit began, President Bush proclaimed the “strong support” of the United States for Macedonia’s NATO bid. In contrast to the contentiousness over Kosovo, virtually the entire alliance backed an invitation for Macedonia. The lone exception was Greece because of its long-standing objection to Macedonia’s name.¹ But in the end, Macedonia was denied an invitation.

In the aftermath of Bucharest, NATO’s Secretary General visited Athens and Skopje, urging resolution of the problem by July so that Macedonia can be admitted to the alliance on schedule with Albania and Croatia. Unfortunately, the prospects for this are remote, in part because NATO unwittingly strengthened the Greek position at Bucharest. The truth is that few in Europe understand the seriousness of the dispute. They scoff at the prospect of tiny Macedonia launching an armed assault to recover the patrimony of Alexander the Great in Greece’s adjacent province that is also called Macedonia.

Trivializing the matter this way distorts the problem and saps the urgency required to deal with it. Identity clashes in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo were primary drivers of those conflicts. The identity stress in Macedonia is no less pernicious. In other words, it is not merely unfortunate that Macedonia did not get a bid to join NATO at Bucharest; rather, it throws into question the entire basis for Macedonia’s internal cohesion. By keeping the Macedonia question open, Serbia, Russia, and other countries can advance their agenda to keep other questions, including Kosovo’s final borders, open. Should Macedonia again descend into conflict, it would almost certainly not remain confined to its current borders.

The urgent task for Europe and the United States is to devise a strategy to deal with the name dispute. This requires understanding its dynamics. Both Macedonia and Greece see challenges to their identities and both have behaved irresponsibly, with Athens resorting to what the Greek scholar Anna Triandafyllidou calls “the strategic manipulation of nationalist feelings by Greek politicians.”² Clinging to a narrow majority and warily eyeing the far right, the conservative government led by Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis has been highly vocal about the name issue. However, the record shows that no matter which government is in power in Athens, its position is remarkably constant. In Skopje, the center-right government of Nikola Gruevski has blatantly exploited nationalist sentiment, taking the provocative step of re-naming the airport after Alexander. But there is a fundamental difference in approaches in the two countries: Greece objects to the Macedonian claims to the legacy of Alexander the Great, but Macedonia does not object to corresponding Greek claims.

This asymmetry yields great insight into the root causes of the dispute -- and how to resolve it. Greece is bothered not just by the name, but what the name represents -- an independent ethnic Macedonian identity. The mere existence of the neighboring nation state founded on national identity carries perceived existential risk for many Greeks. This explains why no amount of written assurances by Skopje can mollify Athens; it also helps explain why after 15 years of UN mediation, the matter has defied compromise.

Endangered Stability

In 2001, Macedonia nearly produced the fourth major conflict since the breakup of Yugoslavia. All the hallmarks of Balkan war were in place, including ethnic flight. In a few short months of fighting, nearly ten percent of the population was displaced. And as in neighboring conflicts, identity was a major factor in the struggle. Leaders of the substantial ethnic Albanian minority (about one-quarter of the population) demanded and won painful concessions from the Macedonian majority to use their language and fly the Albanian national flag. To this day, the provisions of the Ohrid peace agreement that deal with these issues are often contentious. To many Macedonians, the need to change their constitution in order to affirm the Albanian identity was an affront to their own national identity. It is axiomatic, then, that the more threats mount to their own identity, the less inclined Macedonians will be to continue to make concessions --not only on identity related, but in other, equally painful spheres -- to their Albanian partners.

No one knows this better than the ethnic Albanians of Macedonia themselves, who have wisely backed the Macedonian position on the name -- up until the Bucharest summit. According to a recent survey conducted in the wake of the NATO summit, the number of citizens opposed to changing the country’s name has dropped markedly. Analysts believe that this reflects a dramatic change in opinion among Albanians, almost all of whom now back concessions on the issue in order to enter NATO. The failure to enter NATO was a special disappointment for Albanians, for whom the American-led alliance holds both a security and emotive attraction. Many now resent having to pay the cost to protect symbols that mean nothing to them, but mean everything to the country’s majority.

Snubbed at Bucharest, resentment is building among Macedonians as well. Patriotic feeling among the majority Macedonians has hardened. In part, this is the result of calculation by the governing nationalist party, VMRO-DPMNE. Rather than work with the opposition to forge a common front on the name issue after Bucharest, the prime minister called snap elections to be held on June 1, leaving Macedonia barely a month to meet the July NATO deadline to join the alliance in concert with Albania and Croatia.

If the July deadline comes and goes without an invitation to join NATO, then Macedonia’s EU prospects are also dim. After all, Greece has an even more formidable position in the European Union than in NATO, where Macedonia at least can count on the support of the American superpower. This, too, has serious consequences for Macedonian stability. Steadily improving prospects for entering NATO and the European Union have been a primary motivating factor for the majority Macedonian community to embrace both the painful Ohrid concessions as well as the array of institutional reforms mandated by Brussels. With NATO (and EU) entry now formally hostage to Greek approval, the country is suddenly bereft of strategic orientation.

Not only Greek challenges, persistent Serbian challenges to the Macedonian church, and Bulgarian challenges to the Macedonian language and identity create anxiety about the permanence of the Macedonian state. Serbia, with strong Russian support and the backing of some European capitals, continues to mount stiff resistance to Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade and its allies know that many Albanians link Kosovo’s territorial integrity and that of Macedonia. Before Bucharest, the anxiety in Skopje was that Serb-inspired partition of Kosovo would prompt secessionist movement among ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. After Bucharest, the reverse is true: The Serbian-Russian agenda in Kosovo could be advanced by unrest in Macedonia for which the potential remains substantial. In short, any trend toward disintegration in Macedonia would have direct and unavoidable consequences for Kosovo.

The Greek Objection

The place to begin to understand the name dispute is not ancient, but rather recent history. In September 1995, just as the conclusive negotiations over the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were to begin in Dayton, Ohio, American diplomats Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill negotiated an “interim accord” to end a Greek embargo against its neighbor, Macedonia. Among other things, the Macedonians pledged that their constitution contains no territorial claims on Greece. Moreover, they agreed to state that their constitution does not “constitute a basis for interfering in the internal affairs of another state in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other states who are not citizens of [Macedonia.]”

This dry passage reveals a key piece of the puzzle: palpable Greek fear that the adjacent Macedonian state -- with an intact, distinct Macedonian identity -- will become a platform for Greece’s minorities to challenge the status quo. Under Greek law and practice, there are no ethnic minorities. Human rights groups like Human Rights Watch have documented systematic harassment and discrimination of those who attempt to express group or cultural rights. Anyone who doubts that such anxieties are the source of the problem need only read the words of Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis on the eve of the Bucharest summit:

Let me explain the problem as Greeks see it. When Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia changed the name of his country’s southern province in 1944 from Vardar Banovina to the Social Republic of Macedonia, he did it to stir up disorder in northern Greece in order to communize the area and to gain an outlet to the Aegean Sea for his country.

This policy was also linked with the Greek civil war that at the time claimed more than 100,000 Greek lives, brought untold destruction to our country, and delayed our postwar reconstruction for a decade.

The name ‘Republic of Macedonia,’ therefore, is not a phantom fear for us Greeks. It is linked with the deliberate plan to take over a part of Greek territory that has had a Greek identity for more than three millennia and is associated with immense pain and suffering by the Greek people. ³

The problem is not that Bakoyannis is hyping Greek fears; it is that she is conveying them frankly. The “deliberate plan” she describes is not military; it is anticipated, inexorable pressure to acknowledge the existence of the Macedonian minority in Greece.

The question is why does Greece find this so frightening? According to Greek scholar Triandafyllidou, the answer is in the very construct of the modern Greek nation state:

Since the achievement of national independence (1829-30), the Greek state has engaged in a process of construction in which its ethnic origins have been in remote antiquity. The historical trajectory of the nation has been traced in a linear form and without ruptures or discontinuities from antiquity to modernity. Thus, any changes which have marked the past and the history of the national community have been reconstructed in such a way that the nation is represented as a homogeneous and compact unit. ⁴

In other words, ethnic minorities, particularly those with competing claims to cultural totems, are incompatible with the Greek concept of nation- and statehood. The Macedonian minority is especially neuralgic for Greeks because it represents not only an imagined “outsider” or “invader” of the nation, but a very real adversary with whom Greeks clashed in living memory. As is clear from Bakoyannis’s article, anxiety about identity and territory have become fused in Greek consciousness, a legacy of the bitter Greek Civil War.

There are ample grounds for Macedonians to be bitter from that era as well. As Human Rights Watch writes, “ethnic Macedonian political refugees who fled northern Greece after the Greek Civil War of 1946-49, as well as their descendants who identify themselves as Macedonians, are denied permission to regain their citizenship, to resettle in, or even to visit northern Greece. By contrast, all of these are possible for political refugees who define themselves as Greeks.... Ultimately, the government is pursuing every avenue to deny the Macedonians of Greece their ethnic identity.” ⁵

Ironically, the only minority recognized by Greece is the Muslim (Turkish) minority in Western Thrace. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 (and the associated mass population transfers) established the reciprocal rights of the Muslim minority in Greece and of the Greek minority in Turkey. Despite mass displacement and mass loss of property, more than half a century after the fighting there has been no corresponding arrangement to address claims and regulate the affairs flowing from Macedonian-Greek conflict during the Greek Civil War.

As for the Macedonians, their claim to identity is fundamentally different. Slavs did not arrive into the Balkans until many centuries after Alexander’s kingdom had expired. For Macedonians, the nexus to Alexander is not linear, but based on geography, something inherently shared with Greece and Bulgaria. While geography may indeed tempt some extreme nationalists in Macedonia to maximalist territorial ambitions, there is no serious claim to exclusivity of Alexander’s legacy.

Fixing the Mistakes of Bucharest

In sum, the name dispute is largely asymmetrical, with Greece laying exclusive claim to the Macedonian identity. Exacerbating the problem is another asymmetry: EU and NATO member Greece is substantially richer and more powerful than Macedonia. In the run-up to Bucharest, under US pressure to come to terms, Macedonia for the first time agreed to a different name for international use. It accepted UN mediator Matthew Nimetz’s “final proposal”: “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” as its reference for international use. However, Greece flatly rejected it.

To avert an outright Greek veto at Bucharest, allies inserted a paragraph in the final communiqué that lauded Macedonia’s “hard work and commitment” to NATO values and agreed to extend an invitation “as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the ‘name issue’ has been reached.”⁶ To diplomats, the communiqué represented the best alternative to a direct summit confrontation, tacitly acknowledging that Macedonia has met the criteria for membership, and that -- following agreement with Greece over the name -- an invitation could be extended by a simple meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of ambassadors. In fact, by ignoring Greek undertakings, NATO handed Greece a victory.⁷ In Washington, the Greek ambassador exulted: “NATO endorsed our position at Bucharest....The requirement to solve the name issue is no longer a Greek position, it is now a NATO position and a multilateral matter,” he told an audience at Georgetown University.⁸

Already there are signs that Greece is mounting pressure on Macedonia to buckle and accept its position in advance of a European Commission decision on whether to recommend a date for accession talks this fall. And there are also signs that Athens’ position on the name has hardened as well. Sources with knowledge of the negotiations say that Greece is advancing its demands not only that the new name for Macedonia contain a geographical reference (like “Upper Macedonia”), but that this new name be used in all contexts. Athens’ position on “scope of use” may grow to include bilateral relations with other countries, and even Macedonia’s own internal use (for example, stipulating the use of “Upper Macedonia” on the Macedonian passport). Greece is also resisting Macedonia’s demands that its language and nationality be formally recognized by the United Nations.

There are only three possible outcomes for the dispute: continued stalemate; Macedonian capitulation; or Greek willingness to compromise. Continued stalemate is the most likely outcome because Greece faces no external cost to maintaining its position. Athens’ approach suggests that it sees little incompatibility with its substantial private investment in Macedonia and that country’s continued limbo status.

Macedonian capitulation to the Greek position would mean negating the Macedonian identity. As described above, this would pose serious complications to advancing the peace arrangement with Albanians. It also would only encourage related Bulgarian and Serbian assaults on the Macedonian identity, further straining the cohesion of the country.

Only a fair compromise, one that minimally protects the Macedonian identity while addressing the core Greek demand for a name change serves the cause of European stability. Given the disparity in power between Macedonia and Greece, UN mediation alone is unlikely to achieve this. And given the unwillingness of European capitals to take on the burden of confronting Athens, American leadership is once again essential. That means that NATO, where American influence is greatest, offers the best vehicle for success.

The solution, ironically, lies in embracing -- to the fullest extent -- the Greek assertion that the name dispute is now a multilateral matter. Rather than adopt a counterproductive tone of confrontation, the United States must rhetorically step to the side of the Greeks. Bringing along those allies aware of the risks for Kosovo and Macedonia, the United States should move to convene the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for an urgent session to accept the Greek interpretation of the Bucharest communiqué. But it should not stop there. The NAC must simultaneously ask the NATO Secretary General to provide a “full and complete report on all dimensions of the name dispute” within 30 days. The NAC resolution should cite the requirement in NATO’s founding document “for peaceful and friendly international relations” and related obligations in the charter of the United Nations (particularly on human rights). As a result, the NATO Secretary General will have to turn to an array of organizations and individuals, including the UN mediator, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and private organizations like Human Rights Watch.

In short, NATO would begin to move down the very road toward the examination of Macedonian minority rights in Greece that sits at the root of the Greek objection to Macedonia’s name in the first place. The Greek government would pay a heavy political price for such an outcome.

Of course, Athens will see through the ploy and either attempt to block it or veto. This will be complicated. First, a veto would put its interpretation of the summit communiqué in jeopardy. Second, as in Bucharest, Athens will be forced to accept the unenviable role of spoiler. Unlike in Bucharest, however, it will be deprived of the political benefit of standing up to the US president. The NAC ordinarily meets in obscurity, at the level of ambassadors. Furthermore, the draft resolution will be written to embrace the Greek position on the communiqué, not to humiliate or punish Athens. Third, if it vetoes, Athens will have to rue the costs of having to carry another permanent grievance within the alliance. Already it has the annoyance of constant Turkish objections to alliance meetings with the European Union in the presence of Greek-ally Cyprus. It will hardly boost its case by obstructing a reasonable provision to address the very dispute that it insists is an alliance matter.

In sum, the way out of the name dispute is to recognize both the seriousness of the problem and its root causes, and urgently devise a transatlantic strategy that addresses them. The problem is asymmetrical, both in terms of the Greek objection to the Macedonian identity, and Greece’s power relative to Macedonia. Only by introducing the full dimension of the problem, including the question of the Macedonian minority in Greece, will Athens have an incentive to compromise -- and will more instability be averted.

Edward P. Joseph is a visiting fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.

1) France, which counts on Greece for consistent support on ESDP and its bid for a “Mediterranean Union,” supported Greece in its objections to Macedonia’s entry under its name.

2) A. Triandafyllidou, M. Calloni, and A. Mikrakis, “New Greek Nationalism,” Sociological Research Online, vol. 2, no. 1 (1997).

3) Dora Bakoyannis, “The View from Greece,” International Herald Tribune, April 1, 2008.

4) “New Greek Nationalism” (see fn. 2).

5) Ibid.

6) Bucharest Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on April 3, 2008, paragraph 21.

7) In late April, Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski wrote UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon alleging that the Greek veto at Bucharest amounted to a “flagrant violation of Article 11 from the Interim Accord, according to which, Greece has legally undertaken not to object to Macedonia’s admission to international organizations.” Crvenkovski also noted that Greece’s position “could have long-term destabilizing consequences in the region of south-eastern Europe.” Reported in various Macedonian print media on April 22, 2008.

8) Ambassador Alexandros Mallias speaking publicly at Georgetown University, April 15, 2008.

Greece ‘Must Accept Macedonian Identity’

Greece has to accept the existence of a Macedonian nation and language for a quick deal in the ongoing ‘name’ row, Macedonia’s Foreign Minister says.

“Unfortunately their acts do not give us much hope or optimism that Athens is motivated to reach to a reasonable solution,” Antonio Milososki told the BBC’s Macedonian service.

If a solution to the long standing name row is reached prior to July 9, Macedonia could catch up with Albania and Croatia in its efforts to join NATO.

On July 9, Albania and Croatia, the other two countries of the Adriatic Charter will sign the NATO accession protocol.

Greece blocked Macedonia’s invitation to join the alliance in April because of the unresolved row.

Athens argues that Skopje’s use of the name Macedonia could lead it to make territorial claims over Greece’s own northern province of the same name.

On Sunday shortly after Milososki’s party, the centre-right VMRO DPMNE, was reelected by winning a landslide victory in snap polls, the Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis urged Skopje to quickly resume talks on the dispute.

The long running United Nations-sponsored talks have been stalled due to Macedonia’s early general election.

The last UN proposal “Republic of Macedonia-Skopje” was accepted in April by Macedonia while Greece rejected it.

Balkan Fix

NATO's summit in Bucharest last week provided limited blessings for the Balkans. Although Albania and Croatia were invited into the alliance, Macedonia was shunted into the waiting room, Serbia remained on the sidelines, and Russia's persistent threats of renewed regional conflict over Kosovo went unchallenged.

Every NATO success in the Balkans seems to unearth a new problem and the Bucharest gathering was no exception. Positive decisions were reached with unanimous support for Croatia's and Albania's accession, as both countries have achieved the standards necessary for membership. In other favorable moves, Montenegro and Bosnia obtained Individual Partnership Action Plans and Intensified Dialogues to prepare them for future NATO entry.

Alliance leaders indicated a readiness to develop closer relations with Serbia after the parliamentary elections in mid-May. But with pro-Western forces divided and losing support, and the Radical Party likely to be included in the next Serbian government, Belgrade is more likely to edge closer to Russia than to NATO after the national ballot.

The most glaring summit negative was the postponed decision on Macedonia's NATO membership. The country's entry was blocked by Greece after years of stalled negotiations over the country's name and the formal usage of that name. The Macedonian appellation without a geographic or political qualifier is viewed in Athens as a direct challenge to Hellenic patrimony and identity, making it impossible for the Greek parliament to ratify Macedonia's NATO entry.

Unfortunately, the Macedonian authorities became overconfident that Washington would prevail as a mediator in the dispute with Athens and failed to adopt an acceptable compromise position. The country's invitation to NATO depends solely on an agreement with Greece – a prospect that may now prove even more elusive than before the summit.

In the wake of NATO's postponement, Macedonian politics is likely to radicalize. The fragile government, already abandoned by its Albanian coalition partners, could be forced to resign if it agrees to a new name that would entail a constitutional amendment. One can expect a flurry of accusations against Athens and a resurgence of nationalist passions. But this would only diminish Macedonia's reputation as a reliable NATO candidate.

Unless a sound strategy is devised in negotiations with Greece, with high-level U.S. involvement, the ensuing political turmoil may encourage leaders of the Albanian minority to push for territorial autonomy in a swath of territory bordering Kosova and Albania. This would capsize the Ohrid agreement painstakingly devised to ensure interethnic co-existence in a unitary state following the Albanian insurgency in the summer of 2001.

The broader regional consequences of not resolving Macedonia could also prove destabilizing. If Skopje does not promptly recognize Kosovo's statehood and fails to conclude a border agreement with Pristina, it could encourage some Albanian militants inside Macedonia to push for territorial adjustments. The militants might also conclude, in the absence of NATO membership, that Macedonia is merely a "temporary state."

Russia will also seek to benefit from Macedonian uncertainties by prodding for closer economic, political and security ties with Skopje and claiming to be a stalwart protector against pan-Albanianism and "Islamic terrorism." The objective will be to add another property on Moscow's expanding Monopoly board and construct a chain of Balkan dependencies stretching toward Central and Western Europe.

Following the summit declaration that NATO was committed to eventual membership for Ukraine and Georgia – though the alliance stopped short of offering them Membership Action Plans – Moscow issued its customary admonitions against expansion and threatened impending insecurity if Kiev and Tbilisi were invited into NATO. Less noticed but certainly more pressing was a statement from the Kremlin claiming that developments in Kosovo had yet to reach their "hottest phase," indicating that NATO and EU operations would be challenged by Serbian resistance and a push toward partition of Kosovo.

Moscow will continue to capitalize on Kosovo's limited international recognition by creating headaches for NATO and forestalling the further expansion of Western influence. Conflicts, frozen or otherwise, provide opportunities for promoting Russia's interests in a region that has still to be fully secured within Western institutions.

If nationalists form the next Serbian government, NATO should expect closer coordination between Belgrade and Moscow in provoking unrest in Kosovo. They may even precipitate the declaration of a separate Serbian administrative entity in the northern municipalities of Kosovo.

The post-Communist elites throughout Southeast Europe remain susceptible to Moscow's financial enticements and stand to benefit personally from opening up their economies to more substantial Russian penetration. Economic entrapment through an expanding Russian-controlled energy network could also entail political acquiescence to the Kremlin's pan-European objectives.

Moscow is pursuing a dual-track strategy toward the West: widening fissures inside Europe in order to expand its influence, and rolling back the American presence to prevent the permanent detachment of Eastern Europe from the Russian orbit. Seen in this broader strategic context, the Bucharest summit registered some successes in the Balkans, but more extensive and enduring commitments are needed in a still volatile and contested region.

Greece says "could veto Skopje's EU bid as well"

After preventing Macedonia's NATO membership bid, Athens says its wants the name talks continued.

"Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis repeated yesterday his invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to resume talks but added that if the two countries could not settle their name dispute, Athens is prepared to block Skopje’s bid to join the European Union as well as NATO," the daily Kathimerini reported.

Speaking at the end of the NATO summit in Bucharest, Karamanlis insisted that the "use of Greece’s veto to stop FYROM joining NATO was not the end of the matter".

“We want to support the Euro-Atlantic and European course of FYROM but the name issue has to be settled,” he said at a press conference. “We have covered our fair share of ground, now the other side has to move too.”

According to the daily, the prime minister said that Greece wanted to continue negotiations with Skopje under the auspices of the United Nations and made it clear that Athens has a very clear idea of what it wants from the talks.

“Our position is clear – a straightforward, composite name erga omnes (toward all).”

Karamanlis added that it was a “useful tool” for Greece that NATO agreed that the name dispute had to be resolved before Skopje could make another bid to join the alliance, "thereby making the issue more than just a bilateral squabble".

“I never felt isolated and I think that as of yesterday, the understanding of our position has widened,” he added.

There was no response yesterday from Skopje to Karamanlis’s offer to resume talks, the newspaper said. Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Giorgos Koumoutsakos predicted that"it would take some time for emotional reaction in FYROM to settle down".

Kathimerini also said that "at least two Greek businessmen in Skopje claimed their property was damaged following Athens’s use of the veto".

Macedonia 'To Seize Moment' In 'Name' Row

he US envoy to NATO has said a fresh round of Macedonia-Greece talks over the long running “name” row will be held soon.

We will try to close this issue “within days or weeks, not in months” Victoria Nuland told local media after meeting the Macedonia’s President Branko Crvenkovski and Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski.

She urged Skopje to “seize the moment” and try to hammer out a compromise with neighbouring Greece while the issue is still in focus in NATO. Nuland said she was satisfied with the talks in Skopje.

This comes after Athens, last week, vetoed Skopje’s NATO invitation at the alliance’s summit in Bucharest. Athens has urged Skopje to change its constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia,” arguing that it might lead Skopje to make territorial claims over Greece’s own northern province of Macedonia.

As a result, NATO said the invitation for the country would be issued as soon as the row is settled.

However, it is not clear who would represent Macedonia and with what legitimacy if the country goes to an early elections soon.

The key Ruling party, VMRO DPMNE, Wednesday announced it will accept the initiative calling for Parliament’s dismissal filed by the main Albanian opposition party, the Democratic Union for Integration. Read more at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/9253/

The two parties have enough seats in the assembly to adopt the initiative that media report is scheduled to be put to a parliamentary vote on Thursday.

Macedonia has no 'name issue'

In her piece, �Macedonia: What is in a name?� published in the Turkish Daily News on March 31, Ms. Ariana Ferentinou touched upon the �name issue� of the Republic of Macedonia (RM), a question raised by Greece 15-16 years ago.

It was difficult to understand from Ms. Ferentinou's article whether she supports the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic (HR), Mrs. Bakoyiannis, or whether she was just warning her of the complexity of the issue.

Perhaps we should first note that the Republic of Turkey is one of the first countries that recognized the Republic of Macedonia, under the constitutional name (February 1992). In other words, Turkey respected, according to international law, the historical right of our country to the name.

Our constitutional name is actually recognized by over 120 UN member states as well, including most members of the Security Council (China, Russia, Canada), and the U.S. among them. As a matter of fact, before the announcement of the recognition, in 2004, official U.S. Web sites published a long report on Macedonia and the Republic of Macedonia, with facts and arguments on the roots of our nation and its centurial strive for an independent state and with a very clear message � that the U.S. recognizes the historical right of the Republic of Macedonia to that name and that it is not a mere political decision.

Fact about the �problem':

There are a few more facts considering this, artificially imposed �problem�:

1. The Hellenic Republic changed the name of its northern province (Northern Greece and Trace) to Macedonia and Trace in 1989, when the Republic of Macedonia was a federal republic in the former Yugoslavia, since 1944. It could be estimated that this was done in order to meet the future dissolution of Yugoslavia and the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, which occurred in 1991.

2. When our country initiated the procedure for U.N. membership and its process of international recognition, Greece started its obstacles, �fearing� territorial claims from the northern neighbor, the Republic of Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia demonstrated its willingness for good neighborly relations by several painful step-backs � changing the flag and an article in the constitution � to assure Greece of no intentions, as alleged by them. That was not enough for our neighbors and marathon talks on the name started under the mediation of a U.N. representative.

3. So, a lot of energy and time is spent on that, and Macedonia suffered a tremendous slow down of its Euro-Atlantic integration, the isolation of its citizens because of the visa regime, and lower than possible economic growth accordingly, which affected the right of Macedonian citizens on global mobility and economic development as the precondition of a faster and democratic development.

4. Not to forget, at the same time, the Republic of Macedonia, was the key factor in resolving few regional security and humanitarian crises and proved to have the highest level of minority and human rights in the region, even compared to EU member states.

5. Just few days before the �historic� NATO enlargement summit in Bucharest, it seems as if the NATO invitation for the RM, depends of the mercy of the HR to veto or not, despite the RM's accomplishment of all NATO standards and criteria. In this extent, Greece opposes all the other NATO members, who seem to be tired of this �name issue,� but have to follow the principle of solidarity of the Club, which our southern neighbor is misusing by imposing new benchmarks day by day besides others. Macedonia is/was prepared for further talks and to offer a bilateral compromise, but is not prepared for new demands and conditions from the partner, whose goal is to transform the bilateral issue into an international one!

6. In 1995, again under pressure from Greece, Macedonia was obliged to step back and sign an Interim Agreement where it was stipulated that both countries will negotiate on a bilateral basis for the use of the name between them, but that it is no obstacle, to sign and become member of international organizations.

7. You may agree with some analysts and diplomats, who state that the name is the facade, but the real reason for the Greeks is something else. Whatever is behind, the consequence is there � Greece is limiting the right of the RM on integration with the international community, thus limiting the collective and individual rights of our citizens.

8. We are encouraged by some Greeks, actually many, who do not support the policy of their government, fully aware that the �issue� is senseless. We are free to mention one of the Greek former ministers, T. Pangalos, who called the name dispute an �artificial issue,� created during the nationalist policy of Samaras and pointed out that modern Greek policy is today a hostage of this situation.

Greece Ready to Veto Macedonia for EU As Well

Greece is ready to impose a veto on Macedonia's EU membership negotiations as it already did on its NATO membership invitation if the name dispute between the two states is not resolved.

This statement was made by the Greek PM Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek newspaper Ekathimerini reported.

However, Karamanlis has also confirmed his invitation to the Macedonian leaders for the continuing of the negotiations on the name issue.

According to Ekathimerini, Greece would like to carry on negotiating with Macedonia under the aegis of the UN, and had clearly stated its position.

There has been no reply to the Green invitation from Skopje as the Macedonia's Foreign Ministry Speaker has said it would take a while for the emotions to cool down after Greece blocked the country's accession to NATO during last weeks' Summit in Bucharest.

Greece disputes Macedonia's name because one of its northern region has the same name. It has already blocked Macedonia's recognition by the UN under its constitutional name, and that is why the latter is recognized by the world organizations as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

Fears of Balkan instability after Macedonia rebuff

NATO's decision on Thursday not to ask Macedonia to join the alliance raised fears that the former Yugoslav republic could be destabilized and nationalist and anti-Western feeling could be bolstered in the Balkans.

NATO leaders at a summit in Bucharest invited Albania and Croatia to join the 26-nation Western defense alliance, but did not do the same for Macedonia because of the threat of a veto by Greece in a row over the country's name.

Macedonia, which broke from Yugoslavia in 1991, has the same name as Greece's most northerly province. Athens says Skopje must use a compound name such as "New" or "Upper" Macedonia.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki said last week that if NATO membership was blocked, Macedonia would probably pull out of U.N.-sponsored talks with Athens.

That could undermine Macedonia's European Union membership bid because Greece can also veto that.

"Acceptance into NATO has been a hugely important symbolic move for all ex-communist countries. This leaves Macedonia without a foothold in what they perceive to be the 'civilized world'," said a strategic analyst with a leading Western think tank who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Balkans region is already facing increased tension following Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia on February 17.

Macedonia went to the brink of civil war in 2001 between the Slav Macedonian majority and an Albanian minority before an accord brokered by the EU and NATO pulled it back.

"This (NATO decision) will have negative consequences. The Macedonian government will face pressure from inside and outside," Albanian political analyst Mentor Nazarko said of Nato's decision.

Nazarko said NATO's decision would make Macedonia "vulnerable" to regional powers such as Greece and Serbia who he said wanted Macedonia weakened.

SETBACK FOR PRO-WESTERN GROUPS

Macedonia's Albanians, a quarter of its 2 million people, back a compromise with Greece for the sake of NATO and the EU.

They say progress to the West will make them equal partners in a multiethnic society, and help the economy. Most feel uneasy about talk of a glorious ancient history that excludes them.

Aziz Pollozhani, a senior official in Macedonia's largest Albanian party, DUI, said the government had in effect failed at the NATO summit Bucharest .

"It wasn't able to build an appropriate climate, on the contrary made moves seen by Greece as provocative," he said.

Slobodan Casule, a former Macedonian foreign minister, said the delay could create "ethnic tensions and an internal crisis".

He noted that there had been setbacks for pro-Western groups in other parts of the Balkans.

"This will turn into a clear defeat of pro-NATO and pro-EU forces in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans," Casule said. "It will block reforms and postpone indefinitely the negotiations on Macedonia's EU membership."

Former Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski called for calm, not provocative actions.

"Macedonia should not complicate the situation even more with jerky reactions, like withdrawing from the U.N. talks," he told Reuters.

"We should soberly analyze what our next steps should be. We should send a clear signal we're still ready for negotiations so we can finally receive an invitation."

Political analysts said NATO's decision could play into the hands of Macedonian nationalists, enabling them to say compromises with the Albanian minority had served no purpose.

The analysts said the decision could also strengthen nationalists in Serbia, which holds a parliamentary election next month, and anti-Western parties in Serbia who like to play up their friendly ties with Greece.

"They will start banging the drum to exploit this ahead of the May election, saying Greece can help Serbia over (breakaway Albanian-majority) Kosovo," the analyst said.

Greek businesses feel the pain

Greek businesses in Macedonia are very worried and confused as to what had occured this week. The change in Macedonians' attitude was easily noticed since Thursday.

Disappointed with their southern neighbor over the NATO veto, Macedonians have already started canceling their vacations to Greece, opting to Turkey instead.

"I can't say I haven't had cancellations when I have. The interest of Macedonians' to go on vacation in Greece has been drastically lowered." says a worker in Savana, a Tourist Agency.

However, Greek businesses may suffer the most in the Banking sector. Stopanska Banka, which is owned by the Greek National Bank has seen people close their portfolios and transfer to local banks.

The Greek chain Vero still has Macedonians shopping there, but not for Greek products. "To be honest with you, for the first time I looked at the label to see where it is produced. If in Greece, I put it back on the shelf." says Vero shopper.

In Gevgelija a Greek business owner who has invested 1 million Euros in retail stores was baffled by the Greek Government. He spoke to us shortly, on condition of anonymity: "I don't know what to say, I am confused and worried for my investments. I never thought Greece would put a veto, I honestly thought the veto talk was to scare Macedonia."

The 2006 figures put Greek investments in Macedonia at 320 million euros.

Gül regrets Macedonia not invited to join NATO

President Abdullah Gül has said that he regrets NATO's failure to invite Macedonia to join the alliance because of objections from Greece due to a name dispute with the Balkan country.

"NATO's expansion has always been based on the principle of performance. I am disappointed that this principle has been ignored this time and that a bilateral dispute has blocked the membership of a country," Gül told reporters upon his return from a NATO summit in Bucharest.

The Balkan nations of Albania and Croatia were invited to join the alliance during NATO's Bucharest summit, which ended yesterday. Macedonia, however, was rejected at the insistence of Greece, which says the country's name implies a territorial claim to a northern region of Greece, also called Macedonia. Gül said Turkey backed NATO's "open door" policy concerning expansion of the alliance and added that integration of Balkan countries would help stability and security in the region.

While in Bucharest, Gül met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the first meeting between the two leaders, and briefly discussed Turkey's bid to join the European Union with the French leader, a firm opponent of Turkey's membership. "I am happy that we shared our ideas with Sarkozy frankly and sincerely," he said of the meeting. Sarkozy told Gül in their half-hour meeting on Thursday that his country would not block accession talks between the European Union and Turkey during France's six-month term as EU president in the second half of this year.

The process of accession negotiations with Turkey will continue, Sarkozy told Gül on the sidelines of the NATO summit, the Anatolia news agency reported. France, he said, does not oppose the opening of talks on negotiation chapters.

Sarkozy is firmly opposed to Turkey's membership in the EU, saying Turkey does not belong in Europe. France also opposes the opening of accession talks on five chapters that it says are directly related to accession but says talks on other chapters can go ahead. France is taking over the EU's presidency in June from Slovenia, the current holder.

Sarkozy told Gül that some of the chapters could be opened during the French presidency. Gül, for his part, emphasized that Turkey wants full membership in the EU and rejects other alternatives, such as a privileged partnership proposed by German and French politicians.

France is planning a return to NATO's military command, which it quit in 1966. Addressing the NATO summit, Sarkozy said he expected to take a decision on rejoining the integrated military structure after using France's six-month presidency of the EU to build closer European defense integration. Turkey, a NATO member, has raised no immediate objection to French return to NATO's military command. Turkish officials said France's NATO ambition and Paris' objections to Turkey's EU membership are two issues that are considered separately. French plans to return to NATO's military command have led to speculation in Turkey that Ankara might pressure France to drop its objections to Turkish membership in order to help its bid.

While in Bucharest, Gül also met briefly with US President George W. Bush, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Bush reels from NATO setbacks

GEORGE W. Bush was reeling from a summit of setbacks yesterday as his carefully laid plans to invite Ukraine and Georgia into the bosom of the NATO alliance were scuppered by a Russian diplomatic coup.

The expected entry into NATO of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Fyrom) was also blocked by a row over its name.

The twin disasters were not helped when the offers of more NATO troops for the mission in Afghanistan turned out to be more of a trickle than a flow of combat soldiers to take on the Taliban, although Gordon Brown said that there had been encouraging evidence of greater burden-sharing, particularly on civilian projects.

One positive development for Mr Bush was that the Czech Government finally agreed to house a radar system on its soil for the US’s missile defence system, and NATO expressed a desire to bring the whole of Europe under the umbrella of the network.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the head of the NATO alliance, insisted that the summit in Bucharest, the Romanian capital, had been a triumph of decision-making, and declared that even though Ukraine and Georgia were not going to be welcomed yet into the so-called membership action plan — the crucial step to joining the 26-strong organisation — they had been reassured that they would be members one day.

Mr Bush had demanded that Ukraine and Georgia should be offered the membership action plan immediately, but after warnings from President Putin that this would be dangerous for the security of Europe, Germany and France voted to oppose the idea, although they signed up to a compromise offer of eventual membership.

No one was prepared to guess when that may happen. NATO foreign ministers will discuss a possible starting date for the membership plan for the two countries at a meeting in December.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, who dined with NATO leaders last night in Bucharest and is due to hold talks with Mr Bush at the Black Sea port of Sochi tomorrow, was being hailed in Moscow as a diplomatic mastermind for dashing Washington’s dream for Ukraine and Georgia.

Germany and France voiced concerns about opening NATO's doors to them partly because of Europe’s growing dependence on Russian energy supplies. Even Mr Brown failed to support the US plan.

President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine tried to hide his disappointment yesterday by saying: “I’m convinced that Ukraine will be in NATO.”

President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia gave warning that snubbing his nation would be a “bad sign” and would undermine his country’s reform process.

Experts in Moscow said the setback for Mr Bush on his last NATO summit was a clear victory for Mr Putin. “Putin has changed the tone of relations between Russia and the West,” Sergei Karaganov, a Russian political analyst with close ties to the Kremlin, said.

Mr Brown’s aides tried to play down the impact of the decision on Ukraine and Georgia, saying that they were content with the compromise. They said that in refusing to stand with Mr Bush over the issue Britain had denied Russia the opportunity to exploit a damaging split within the alliance. They also said that Germany had been forced to accept in principle Nato’s eastward expansion.

The hitch over Fyrom also spoilt what was supposed to be a celebration of three new Balkan countries joining the alliance — Albania, Croatia and Fyrom itself. All three had passed the tests for membership, but Greece vetoed Macedonia on the ground that it had the same name as its northern province.

After failing to reach a compromise, NATO leaders were forced to put the invitation to Fyrom on hold until the clashing names could be resolved. The Macedonian delegation walked out of the summit in protest.

On Afghanistan, Mr Brown’s and Kevin Rudd's call for countries to contribute more troops fell on mostly deaf ears. NATO officials admitted that despite the offer from President Nicolas Sarkozy of France of about 700 extra troops, the mission in Afghanistan would still be two battle groups short of what was needed.

Only a handful of nations pledged extra soldiers. New Zealand promised an extra 18. Portugal, Poland, Romania and Croatia have all signalled extra troops but only Georgia, which has said it might send up to 500, rivalled the French commitment.

In Bucharest a Greek-Macedonian dispute over stability

One of the most important post-Cold War NATO summits is over. The results should be scrutinized by President Bush and his advisors. Actually is was them who sup-ported a specific single-dimensional policy in a number of issues that drove American diplomacy to isolation and brought to the surface, once again, the division within the Atlantic Alliance.

One of these stemmed from the divergent views between Greece and the US over the "Macedonian" issue created by Yugoslav leader in 1945 with the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, today Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The issue has been a dormant volcano for decades since Greeks worries about the overt and covert expressions of irredentist claims against its northernmost province Macedonia because of NATO´s policy. NATO supported Tito in its effort to emanci-pate from the Soviet Union and after this became a political reality overlaid Greek worries for 45 years. The need to support the enemy of our enemy prevailed over the legitimate concern of an ally who eventually was used to support the geopolitics of the West.

The "Macedonian Issue", a time-proof dispute in the Balkans, first emerged as a side-effect of the evolution of the "Eastern Question" and the liberation of the Ottoman conquests, namely the Balkan peoples, who gradually rose against the conqueror and attempted to set up their territorial bases with a view to forming nation-states. In a sense it emerged as the result of antagonism among Balkan nation-states that wished to get the lion´s share from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the course to liberation had hardly finished when Balkan peoples turned against each other, in order to secure a greater territorial chunk out of the Balkan peninsula, a policy that led contending Balkan nationalisms to clash. In the inter-war and post second World War era, the dispute was rooted in the rivalry over control of geographical Macedonia.

In the post-Cold War era the re-emergence of the issue triggered heated arguments as to how legitimate Balkan nationalisms were and how they should be treated. The pro-tection of human rights seemed to have clashed with the axiom of respect for the terri-torial status, a trend that established a new "paradigm" in the international political arena. The difficulty in adopting a balanced policy in the post-Cold War Balkans lied in drawing a line between post-communist nationalism and its legitimate aim in estab-lishing or strengthening national identities as a part of the de-communisation process and overt of covert irredentism that threatened the fragile territorial status in the Bal-kans. As a matter of ideology the West acknowledged, to a certain degree, emerging nationalistic trends in the Balkans as an expression of long-suppressed freedom of ex-pression, individual or ethnic, as well as cultural diversification that have been mar-ginalised dramatically under the homogenising cloak of the communist ideology.

The Greek-FYROM conflict over the latter´s constitutional name has two main as-pects. One is political and related to regional security and border stability. The second is historical. This aspect appears to have dominated the approaches of outsiders who have not studied the politics and ethnological features and perplexity of the region. Post-Cold War Balkan nationalism were evaluated as "new and legitimate", yet this evalua-tion did not provide a "ceiling" of legitimacy that would allow analysts to draw a line be-tween "legitimate" and "non-legitimate" nationalism.

Under this spectrum history became the weapon in the hands of nationalists trying to legiti-mize irredentist claims. This to remind everyone that the issue is not primarily or exclusively an issue over historical accuracy and continuity. Originally both sides turned the dis-pute into a fudge over history, while the conflict bears significance in the security level and ought to be seen through the degree of legitimacy of the need of Balkan peoples, living under oppressing communist regimes, to express their cultural identity.

To outsiders it has always been an expression of Balkan irrationality in a region lack-ing natural resources and an advanced political culture. This was rather evident even today in the caricature of the Greek Prime Minister, K. Karamanlis wearing a Nazi outfit published in Skopje or the Greek flag with the Nazi symbols. To the Greek peo-ple it was an act of insult to a nation that has offered so much in the war against Na-zism.

The quest for "historical accuracy" became the sole means of establishing an ethnic identity and a powerful ideological weapon in the hands of nationalists. As pointed out, "at times…modern nationalists propagate by rewriting history and backdating their own modern concepts on to history…In the modern world, nations can in certain circumstances and under certain conditions be seen to be created…a process of eth-nogenesis" (Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians, Hurst & Company, (London, 1995), p.3). However, the suggested ethnogenesis or ethnic emancipation process should not be done at the expense of another national identity, as the "birth" of an ethnic identity may be a threat to another nation. The creation or emancipation of an ethnic group may also take place at the cost of eliminating historical facts, which become the target of nationalism. Here "nationalism" is defined as "an activist ideological movement which aims to unite all members of a given people on the basis of a putative shared culture".

The question that needs to be answered is whether nationalism was behind Slav Ma-cedonian claims over Greek history, and the implied association of Slav Macedonians with Greek Macedonia. It may be so, since "history often assumes enormous signifi-cance for nationalists", who use it "to show the past control of a territory by a state to which the modern nation can claim affinity" (Hugh Poulton ). This may provide expla-nation as to why Slav Macedonian nationalists engaged themselves in a process of rebuilding history, in their own image to fit their political aims. I have been a witness of the insane logic of "liberating" Greek Macedonia as a young student in Toronto Canada (1981) when a man of age told me in perfect Greek that it was "his duty to liberate Greek Macedonia from Greece". It was the first time I had ever heard of the issue and this illustrates that NATO policy to support Tito during the Cold War has been successful. Even Greeks ignored the issue since the Greek governments followed NATO´s dictates and managed to hide an issue that today constitutes the kernel of the Greek-FYROM dispute.

A solution is so much needed and this is to everyone´s interest. However, national identities, whether they are true or constructed, they cannot change overnight even after a political decision. Diasporas operate on a psychological framework that estab-lishes powerful links with the past. Actually this may explain why Slav Macedonians aim at uniting parts of geographical Macedonia and blatantly ignore the fact that the Macedonian ethnicity was established with a Cominform decision and that it was a mater of ideology. Article 2 of the stature of the establishment (April 1926) of the "United I.M.R.O" set the ideological, political and intellectual framework for the creation of a "united and independent Macedonia", which was to become the "Swit-zerland of the Balkans". It propagated that a "the free and independent Macedonian state will be established on the basis of the entire equality of national, political, civil, and cultural rights for all the nationalities which inhabit it".

Comintern attempted to enhance relations among Balkan peoples, in order to boost the so desired "ideological homogeneity" of the Balkans. From the catalytic 1934 Comintern thinking, concerning the "Macedonian Question", that dominated the agenda of the communist gathering, D. Vlahov, leader of VMRO in Bulgaria recalls: "I mentioned earlier that the Comintern itself wanted the Macedonian question con-sidered at one of the consultations of its executive committee. One day I was in-formed that the consultation would be held. And so it was. Before it convened, the inner leadership of the committee had already reached its stand, including the ques-tion of the Macedonian nation,…It was concluded that the Macedonian nation exists" (Dimitar Vlahov, Memoari, Skopjie, 1970), p. 357). It seems that the existence or not of a single "Macedonian nation" became the central issue of a rather philosophical, an-thropological debate, that could not establish its existence through tangible, epistemo-logical criteria, a fact that dictated the recognition of a "Macedonian Nation" through an ideological formulae.

In the process the American administrations expressed their concern over irredentism against Greek Macedonia. This revisionist policy caused immediate American re-sponse to the issue, expressed by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, who categori-cally denied the existence of a "Macedonian nation", stating: "The Department has noted with considerable apprehension increasing propaganda rumours and semi-official statements in favour of an autonomous Macedonia, emanating principally from Bulgaria, but also from Yugoslav Partisan and other sources, with the implica-tion that Greek territory would be included in the projected state. This Government considers talk of Macedonian "nation", Macedonian "Fatherland", or Macedonian "national consciousness" to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic nor political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive inten-tions against Greece" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, (Washington, 1969), pp. 302-303).

Again, T. Niles, American ambassador to Athens, made the following statement in 2361992: "the Communist regime of Tito had created the Republic of Macedonia with a view to annexing northern Greece"; (Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, June 23, 1992, Washington: US Government Printing Office, p. 14).

All the above would not matter today if history die not operate as the basis of modern irredentism. Greece and FYROM can and should be parts of the same alliance that has offered so much in European security after the Second World War. Yet, this should be done in a way that does not leave space for future misunderstandings.

The ontological and critical question that rises then is why should Greece deny its neighbours their right to identify themselves as they wish. After all this appears to be linked with the right of a small nation to survive a hostile environment under an im-minent Albanian threat. Greece does nor certainly constitute an actual threat to the country´s survival. It has made substantial compromises although personally I think that name issue is not the most important. What is important is to look ahead into the future and construct it with new material not the leftovers of the communist era. Greece supports the FYROM´s bid for NATO and EU accession not because it is an altruistic state but simply because it serves stability and development in the region. The rules for such a strategic engagement are now clear to everyone, including the US.

Unbefitting Behavior

f NATO cannot pressure Greece to lift its childish blockade of Macedonia’s membership bid, the EU should.

Amid the fanfare of an agreement over US missile defense plans and the rejected membership aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine, news on NATO’s Bucharest summit largely overlooked the fate of Macedonia – or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), as the country has been ingloriously called since it joined the United Nations in 1993.

While Albania and Croatia both received invitations to join the alliance, Macedonia was left waiting outside after Greece, to the chagrin of NATO’s leadership, blocked Skopje’s bid. There were no claims from Athens of a lack of military readiness on the part of the Macedonians, only a refusal to budge in the long-running debate with the country over its constitutional name. Since 1991, after Macedonia gained independence from the former Yugoslavia, Greece has protested again the use of “Macedonia” and “Republic of Macedonia” because it sees the name as implying a territorial claim on Greece’s northern Macedonia province.

A NOT SO GREAT DISPUTE

The claim that Macedonia has designs on northern Greece appears patently absurd. Even the most fervent nationalist would be hard-pressed to explain how a poor country of 2 million could ever possibly hope to conquer a neighbor so much larger, richer, and more powerful. And precisely NATO membership serves to contain territorial ambitions and historic animosities.

The Greeks don’t need to look far for an example: NATO’s wise decision of 1952 to accept both Turkey and Greece has surely been a key factor in preventing disputes over Cyprus, as well as Aegean airspace and sovereignty, from escalating into war. More recently, the entry of Hungary, along with the other Central European states, helped assuage regional fears over Hungarian irredentism. If anything, Greeks would have less to fear if Macedonia joined the alliance.

Clearly, there is more at stake here, and it would be difficult not to assume that the wildly unpopular government of Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis has continued to use the name dispute to fuel its own flagging support and preserve its narrow parliamentary majority. A recent poll showed that 84 percent of Greeks approved of Greece vetoing Macedonia’s NATO bid if no compromise could be reached in time. The opposition, seeing the opinion polls, has also shamelessly sided with the government.

Yet, as TOL has reported, Greeks and Macedonians that deal with each other on a daily basis have no such problems getting along and hardly care about the name issue. They just want to get on with business.

The Macedonians haven’t really helped matters either. The decision in December 2006 to rename the airport in Skopje after Alexander the Great, whom the Greeks consider a central part of their heritage, was predictably viewed as a provocation. Was it really that difficult to pick another name, especially when the Greeks already have Megas Alexandros International Airport at Kavala in the neighboring Greek region of Macedonia? And this past week, in a case of extremely poor timing, billboards appeared around Skopje showing the Greek, blue-and-white-striped flag with a swastika instead of the classic cross. While the authorities were not responsible – the posters advertised a private art show – their reaction was slow, and only in response to an official diplomatic complaint.

LET COOLER HEADS PREVAIL

The repercussions of a delayed NATO bid are very real. For many in Macedonia, the name issue festers, heightening their feelings of insecurity and defensiveness and feeding their nationalistic inclinations. Before the Bucharest summit, approximately 90 percent of the population supported membership. The decision to send soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan was largely supported as a fair price to pay for possible acceptance into the alliance. And, importantly, the common goal of membership served to unite the country’s two main ethnic groups, the Slavic Macedonians and Albanians, whose skirmishes in 2001 nearly erupted into a fully-fledged war.

Now all bets are off and the future unclear. The disappointment in Skopje gave rise to countless interpretations over what had transpired in Bucharest and what should be done. Some ethnic Macedonians – already much more inclined than Albanians to say the name issue is more crucial than NATO membership – have called for an end to any negotiations over the name and even suspending the agreement that allowed the country to enter the United Nations under the FYROM designation.

Others have talked of bringing the soldiers back, cutting off all ties with Greece, and forgetting altogether about membership in the EU and NATO. They see Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and subsequent recognition by much of the international community and wonder why they shouldn’t try to gain recognition of the country by its constitutional name. Not surprisingly, support for NATO has sharply fallen.

Hopefully (and probably), cooler heads will prevail and the sting of rejection will wear off in a matter of weeks, if not days. NATO membership should remain front and center in Macedonia’s ambitions – even if it won’t obviously be a quick fix for all of the country’s ills, especially its 35 percent unemployment rate. But, as proponents of enlargement tirelessly argued before several Central European states were accepted in 1999, membership does convey a very real sense of reliability to the outside world, including potential investors. It is also, at least psychologically, a big stepping stone on the way to membership in the EU, both for the country itself (progress does have its rewards) and EU member states (if they joined one elite club, they might be ready soon for ours).

BALL NOW IN BRUSSELS’ COURT

At every other instance of nationalism in the Balkans, in Central Europe, and elsewhere, there is incessant hand-wringing in Brussels, followed by a flurry of communiqués condemning the alleged perpetrators, calling for calm, and threatening this or that state that its actions could impede possible membership. Greece, on the other hand, has gotten away with blocking a country’s movement toward stability and prosperity over nothing more than a name that harms its pride over its glorious history and supposedly suggests territorial ambitions.

Are there really no buttons to push to force the Greeks to concede? While one may not agree with the view of some NATO states to postpone membership for Georgia and Ukraine so as not to antagonize Russia, it is surely an opinion to be taken seriously. But Greece? We are hardly talking here about a European powerhouse that drives the continent, politically or economically – a country to fear one way or another.

We have now reached a point where the EU, supposedly all about quenching such disputes on its territory, should consider isolating Greece. Only eight years ago, after Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party joined a coalition government in Austria, EU member states stopped cooperating with Vienna. While the effectiveness of those “political sanctions” has been debated, something of the sort should at least be considered for an EU member state clearly engaging in a nationalistic, populist game with public opinion – a member state twice condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for its attempts to ban an association and a political party representing the Macedonian minority.

A precedent for a hard-line stance with Greece does exist. Back in 1994, Greece imposed a trade embargo on Macedonia over the name issue, cutting off the country from the port of Thessaloniki. Angered about the impact on Macedonia, already suffering because of an existing UN embargo on Yugoslavia to the north, the European Commission took Greece to the EU’s European Court of Justice, doubly embarrassing because Greece headed the EU presidency at the time.

Similar pressure today could, in the end, also serve as a face-saving measure for the Greek government. To be fair to today’s politicians, their intransigence is a product of the poor diplomacy of their predecessors and their tendency to play the nationalist card. Pushed into a corner over the name issue – where compromise would be viewed as failure – Karamanlis could instead blame the EU. He could say he had no other choice but to compromise, or face isolation. After 17 years, it’s time for a change in tactics.

No. That’s Not Your Name!

As someone whose research and teaching center on modern Eastern Europe, the most recent news from across the Atlantic is just more fodder for a great lectu